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ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION-TORTs-A passenger on a launch who jumped
from the boat to a pier at the command of the master in charge, was in-
jured by the boat bumping against him while he was drawing himself up on
the pier. Held: The federal courts of admiralty have no jurisdiction of an
action to recover for this injury. Gordon v. Drake; 159 N. W. 34o (Mich.
i916)..
The admiralty courts have no jurisdiction over torts which are not
consummated on the high seas or navigable waters of the United States.
The "Plymouth," 3 Wallace 20 (U. S. 1865). Docks and wharves are but
extensions of the shore whether they project over the water or not. The
"Mary Stewart," io Fed. i37 (1881). But admiralty has jurisdiction of
injuries to property located in navigable waters which is solely an aid to
navigation, such as a beacon, even though the foundations thereof are built
on the bed of the river. The "Blacksheath," 195 U. S. 361 (i9o4). The
location and purpose of the structure are controlling. The "Raithmoor,"
241 U. S. 166 (916).
To give the courts of admiralty jurisdiction it is sufficient that the
actual injury occurs on the water, even though the active agent originated
on the land. Hermann v. Port Blakely Mill Co., 69 Fed. 646 (1995). It is,
however, not always easy to say just where the. injury occurred. See as
to this the interesting cases of "The H. S. Picklands," 42 Fed. 239 (189o),
and "The Strato," 98 Fed. 998 (igoo).
In the absence of a statute, admiralty has no jurisdiction of an action
to recover for the death of a seaman, Rainey v. N. Y. and P. S. S. Co.,
216 Fed. 449 (1914), but when such remedy is given by a state statute it
can be enforced by proceedings in admiralty. "Swayne and Hoyt v. Barsch,
226 Fed. 581 (igs). If the injury which causes the death occurs on the
water, the statutory remedy may be enforced in admiralty even though the
death occurs on shore. The "Chiswick," 231 Fed. 452 (t916).
Until recently it was thought that the locality of the tort was the sole
test of admiralty jurisdiction. But in Campbell v. Hackfeld, z25 Fed. 696
(i9o3), it was decided that though the tort occurred on the water, if it was
not of a maritime nature, admiralty had no jurisdiction. This case was
followed in "The St. David," 2o9 Fed. 985 (1913), on identical facts. Though
the injury which was said to be non-maritime in those cases was held to
be of a maritime nature in Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U. S.
52 (1914), the question of whether the non-maritime nature of the tort
would be a bar to the jurisdiction of admiralty is expressly left open.
See 16 Harv. L R. 210, and 25 Harv. L. R. 381.
BANKRUPTCY-JU'RISICTION OF BANKRUPTCY COURT OVER ESTATE OF THE
BAss KRuPT-The vendor of goods obtained by fraud brought replevin to
rescind after an involuntary petition in bankruptcy was brought against
the vendee. The referee ordered him to refrain from prosecuting this
action. Hcld: Upon filing of the petition all the property in the bankrupt's
possession came under the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court, and is no
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longer the subject of action in a state court. -In re .Wellmade Gas Mantle
Co. 233 Fed. 25o (1916).
The filing of the petition in bankruptcy is a caveat to all the world"
and acts as an attachment of all the property then in the possession of the
bankrupt, Mueller v. Nugent, 184 U. S. i (i9ox), and the bankruptcy couft
has the paramount jurisdiction of that property no matter how the bat&.
rupt obtained it. Blake v. Openhym, 216 U. S. 322 (i909). Thiiaiso
applies to property of the bankrupt in the possession of a sheriff under
an attachment which is dissolved by the adjudication in bankruptcy, In re
Walsh Bros., 159 Fed. 56o (igo8) ; to property constructively in the bank-
rupt's possession, Orinoco Iron Co. v. 34etzel, 230 Fed. 4o (1916); and
to debts due the bankrupt, In re Ransford, 194 Fed. 658 (1912). This prop-
erty may not be seized by attachment and garnishee process, State Bank
of Chicago v. Cox, 143 Fed. 91 (006); under a writ of replevin, In re
Walsh Bros., .'upra. or by attachment under a chattel mortgage, Fairbanks
Shovel Co. v. Wills, 24o U. S. 642 (19,6).
If the property is seized by legal process after filing of the petition
and converted, the trustee may waive the tort and sue in assumpsit for the
proceeds. State Bank of Chicago v. Cox, supra; Dittemore v. Cable Milling
Co., 101 Pac. 594 (Idaho x9og). A creditor who removes and conceals
such property is guilty of a contempt against the District Court. In re-
Iron Clad Mfg. Co., 195 Fed. 781 (1912).
The law was the same under the Bankruptcy Act of March 2, 1867 (14
U. S. Stat. at Large, 517). In re Fogel, 7 Blatchf. U. S. C. C. Rep. (i8f);
In re Steadman,'22 Fed. Cases 1155 (1873).
BANKS AND BANxiNx---CoLLcroNs-To BANK TRUSTEE ox Dmoit--The
proceeds of two notes deposited for collection, having been placed to de-
positor's credit, were appropriated by the cashier. Held: The, depositee was
liable as debtor. Minnesota Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Taggus State Bank,
158 N. W. 1063 (N. D. 1916).
The general view is that where paper is deposited for collection, the
paper is in trust until collection, Peoples Bank v. Miller, 152 N. W. 257
(Mich. igis), and that after collection, the relation of debtor and creditor
arises. Marine Bank v. Fulton Bank, 2 Wallace 252 (U. S. 1864).
The modern cases present many variations and not infrequent con-
trary views. It has been held that the collecting bank had no authority to
mingle the proceeds after collection with its general deposits since the
proceeds were being held in trust. State Bank v. National Bank of Atchi-
son, 187 S. W. 673 (Ark. x916). This trust passes to the assignee after
an assignment for the benefit of creditors. Anheuser-Busch Ass'n v. Morris,
36 Neb. 31 (1893). If the proceeds are mixed with the general deposits,
the whole is impressed with the trust. Kansas Bank v. First State Bank,
62 Kan. 788 (19oi). In Young v. Teutonia Bank, 134 La..879 (1914), it
was held that the bank has the authority to mix the procids unless an
express agreement bars the right, and, if such an agreement exists, a trust
arises for the proceeds. First National Bank of Raton v. Dennis, 146
Pac. 948 (N. M. 1915). if, contrary to instructions, the bank does mingle
the proceeds and credits the depositor therewith, a debt arises. Citizens
Bank of Danville v. Haymes, 87 S. E. 399 (Ga. t915).
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In First National Bank v. McMillan, 83 S. E. 149 (Ga. 19T4), it was
considered a question of the intent of the parties, whether a note was
deposited for collection or whether it was sold, the presumption being
that where paper is deposited in blank, that it is deposited for collection
merely; but where the paper is drawn in favor of the bank, the contrary
presumption is authorized. Gettysburg National Bank v. Kahns, 62 Pa.
88 (1869).
Where a bank credits a depositor with the amount of the draft before
collection, such has been held a trust. Stones River National Bank v. Leman
Milling -Company, 63 So. 776 (Ala. 1913). But oppositely to this it has
been held that an agreement whereby the bank credited the depositor .with
the amount of' the paper before collection, created a -debt. German Bank
v. Carnegie Trust Company, i58 N. Y. Supp. 222 (i9i6). Still another
view is that such a transaction merely creates a presumption in favor of a
debt. Franklin National Bank v. Roberts, 168 N. C. 473 (1915).
In Arkansas Bank v. Martin, v63 S. W. 745 (Ark. 1914), it-was held
that where the owner of a note demanded the proceeds after the crediting
of the proceeds to a depositor who had obtained possession of the note
by fraud, for collection by the bank, that it was the duty of the bank to
pay such proceeds to the owner.
A collection after insolvency of collecting bank is outside the bank's
authority and it holds such proceeds in trust. Walker v. O'Neill, 66 So.
994 (Fla. 1914).
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-UNREASONABLE POLicE REGULATIONS-"IMPORTED
EGs"--A statute provided that any person selling imported. eggs shall:
(I) Mark each egg, "imported"; (2) report each shipment received to the
state board of health; and (3) display a sign in his store, "Imported eggs
sold here." Held: This imposes such an onerous burden upon dealers as
to be an unjust attempt to exercise the police power. Ex parte Foley, 158
Pac. iO34 (Cal. 1916).
According to the interpretation of the commerce clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment by Chief Justice Marshall in Brown v. Maryland, 12
Wheaton 419 (1827). a state statute not based on considerations of public
welfare but solely to prevent non-residents from the advantages of local
trade or discriminate in favor of local residents is unconstitutional as an
attempt to regulate commerce. Spellman v. New Orleans, 45 Fed. 3 (89i).
Statutes have been held inconstitutional which require peddlers to be
licensed but which except those who sell goods made in the stat4 Velton
v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275 (1875), which prohibit the sale of trees not grown
in the state unlesss the vendor file a bond, etc., with the Secretary of State.
In re Schrechter, 63 Fed. 695 (1894), which prohibit the sale of convict-
made articles unless so stamped, People v. Hawkins, 157 N. Y. I (x898).
which prohibit the importation of docked horses, Stubbs v. People, go
Pac. 1114 (Colo. 319) (though a statute prohibiting the use of docked horses
is constitutional, Bland v. People. 32 Colo. 319 [1904]), which require very
onerous duties from persons without the state who wish to deal in stocks.
Geiger-Jones Co. v. Turner, 2.3o Fed. 233 (1916). But see State v Stu4ker,
58 la. 496 (1892) where a statute prohibiting the sale of liquors 
except those
made from fruit grown in the state was upheld.
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Where, however, the purpose of the statute is to guard the public
health or prevent fraud upon thc public, it is within the state's police
power. So a statute requiring lard substitutes to be so labelled is valid.
State v. Snow, 8r Ia. 642 (i89i); State v. Aslesen, So Minn. 5 (189a).
Or one prohibiting the manufacture and sale of oleomargarine. Powell v.
Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678 (1887); affirming Powell v. Commonwealth, 114
Pa. 265 (886).
It has been held that when an article is so wholesome that a trial court
must take judicial notice of the fact, the legislature cannot prohibit the
sale; but if there is a dispute, the legislature can regulate or prohibit: State
v. Layton, 16o Mo. 474 (19oo). Oleomargarine is such an article as it is
not within the state's police power to exclude it from commerce. Schollen-
berger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U. S. 1 (1897); reversing Commonwealth v.
Powell, i7o Pa. 284 (895).
CONTRACT-Gu.RANT---NOTICE TO GUARANOT--A guaranty was made
in response to an offer by the guarantee and acted upon without notice of
acceptance being given. Held: Notice was unnecessary. Oklahoma City
Nat'l Bank v. Ezzard, i59 Pac. 267 (Okla. 1916).
Whether a guaranty is only an offer or an absolute promise, depends
on the intention of the parties and the facts and circumstances attendant
thereon. Stewart v. County Bank, 71 Ark. 585 (19o3); Booth v. Irving
Bank, 116 Md. 668 (19i1). If a direct and absolute guaranty, not a mere
proposal, no notice of acceptance is necessary. Frost v. Standard Metal
Co., 215 11. 240 (i9o5) ; Reese v. Medical Co, 172 S. W. 82o (Ark. 194);
Valley Bank v. Cowrie, 145 N. W. 9o4 (Ia. 1914). It has been held an
endorsement of the buyer's performance of a contract of sale on the back
of said contract, is a binding guaranty. York v. Powell, 187 S. W. 628
(Ark. 1916). Also, a promise to make a loan if certain guaranty was fur-
nished. Nat'l Bank v. Zimmer Co., 156 N. IV. 265 (Minn. I916). A guar-
antor may, by a stipulation in the contract, waive notice of the acceptance.
Holmes v. Schwab, go S. E. 313 (Ga. 1913); International Co. v. Mabbott,
159 Wise, 423 (1915). It has been held that no notice need be given, that
the names of two additional guarantors were added to the guaranty, after
guarantor had signed, without his knowledge or consent. State Bank v.
King, 9o Atl. 453 (Pa. 1914). A request for the execution of a second
guaranty containing additional provisions, does not constitute a rejection
of the guaranty first given. American Co. v. Moskowitz Bros., 159 App.
Div., N. Y. 382 (1913).
Notice is necessary where a guaranty is executed by the guarantor with-
out any previous request, Lester Piano Co. v. Romney, 126 Pac. 324 (Utah
1912), and where notice of acceptance is stipulated for, Asmussen v. Post
Pub. Co., 143 Pac. 396 (Col. 1914), or where guarantee's agent in soliciting
the guaranty promises that guarantor will receive notice of acceptance.
Dakota Bank v. Kleinschmidt, 139 N. W. 348 (S. D. 1913). So in the
case of a continuing guaranty; or a guaranty of a future contingent event,
notice that the guaranty has become operative, must be given. Davis Co.
v. Richard, 15 U. S. ;24 (1885) ; Black v. Grabow. 216 Mass. 5j6 (1914).
It must be uithin a reasonable time, since failure to give such notice will
defeat the guaranty pro tanto, at least if it has operated injuriously to the
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guarantor. Wanamaker v. Brown, 5o Atl. 512 (Del. igo); American AgrL
Co. v. Ellsworth, 83 At. 546 (Me. 1912).
In Pennsylvania, except in cases of absolute guaranty accepted when
given, notice of acceptance is necessary, even if the guaranty is made at
the request of the guarantee. Evans v. McCormick, 167 Pa. 247 (1895);
Columbia Baking Co. v. Schissler, 35 Pa. Super. Ct. 62t (i9o8). But
where the offer is made in one state and accepted in another, it is a con-
tract of the latter state, and the Pennsylvania court will apply the law of
that state. Hartley Mfg. Co. v. Berg, 48 Pa. Super. Ct. 419 (191).
EVIDENCE-CONFESSIONS-VOLUNTARY CHARACTER-A statement by the
prisoner that he would confess preceded in point of time a remark made
by an officer that it was always best to tell the truth. Held: Since the pris-
oner, had already made up his mind to declare the truth, the confession was
not involuntary and was, therefore, admissible. People v. .Wilkinson, 158
Pac. io67 (Cal. i916).
Confessions or disclosures are inadmissible when made under any
promise or encouragement of hope or favor. U. S. v. Pumpherys, I Cr.
C. C. 74 (8o2); Commonwealth v. Hanlon, 8 Phila. 423 (Pa. 187o), or
under the influence of fear-produced by threats, State v. Poole, 84 Pac. 727
(Wash. i9o6), or when induced by solitary confinement, as in a dark cell,
State v. McCullum, Si Pac. io4 (Wash. j897).
r When there is no suggestion or intimation that any benefit might result
.rom the confession, it is admitted as voluntary, Strong. v. State, 88 N. W.
772 (Xeb. 19o2), even when coupled with a proposition by the prisoner
to compromise the case, such offer not being induced by another.t Hecox
v. State, 3! S. E. 592 (Ga. i898).5rFailure to caution the prisoner about
making statements is no bar to their admissibility, State v. Baker, 36 S. E.
Soz (S. C. igoo) ; State v. Hand, 58 Ati. 64t (X. J. 19o4),Snor need he be
told that they will be used against him, Golson v. State, 26 So. 97s (Ala.
z899). fontra. Wright v. State, 37 S. W. 732 (Tex. i896).-'Warning given
a few hours before the confession is not too remote, Balls v. State, 40 S. W.
8o1 (Tex. 1897); but it has been held otherwise if given the day before. 2
Perry v. State, 6i S. W. 4o0 (Tex. i9o1).
The fact that the accused was under arrest at the time of the confession
is not of itself sufficient to exclude it. People v. Miller, 135 Cal. 69 (191o);
Commonwealth v. Devaney, 64 N. E. 402 (Mass. i9o2); nor is his pro-
tection by an officer considered an inducement, Price v. State, 40 S; E. 1ois
(Ga. i902); Stevens v. State, 35 So. 122 (Ala. I9o3).5 It is immaterial
whether the one making the inducement be a private person or an officer
so far as the admissibility is concerned,,n rc Thorn, 4 City H. Rec. 81 (N.
Y. 1819), and People v. White, 68 N. E. 63o (N. Y.- 19o3), where a con-
fession was made to an officer feigning friendship.
5 If the confession be voluntary, the fact that unsuccessful attempts were
previously made to obtain it by undue influence does not render it inadmis-
sibl Commonwealth v. Crocker, io8 Mass. 464 (1871); Levison v. State,
54 Ala. 5--o (875)/'A confession following an inducement is voluntary if
not so connected with it as to be a consequence of it Moore v. Common-
wealth. 2 Leigh 7oi (Va. 183o) ; State v. Hopkirk, 84 Mo. 278 (i884 ).ACon
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vincing affirmative proof must show this Porter v. State, S Ala. 95
(i8;6); McMaster v. State, 34 So. 156 (Miss. i9o3).SFurther onfessions
not asked for are admissible even when following inducements Brewer v.
State, 78 S. W. 772 (Ark. i9o4).
A confession made on promise of freedom is admissible though the
prisoner later refuses to testify, Commonwealth v. Knapp, 2 Mass. (zo
Pick.) 477 (1830). Contra, Womack v. State, i6 Tex. App. i78-(t884), or
where he escapes from custody and so fails to perform his agreement, State
v. Moran, 14 Pac. 419 (Ore. 1887). On the other hand it has been held
that there must exist previous warning that the confession will be used
in such case. Lopez v. State, 12 Tex. App. 27 (1882).
-9 EVIDEMcE-DECLARATIONS OF CONSPIRATORS-In a prosecution for con-
spiracy, the court admitted in evidence the declaration of a co-conspirator,
made after the conspiracy had ended ind when the declarant was under
subpoena to appear before the grand jury. Hcld: Thapuch declarations
were not admissible against the declarant's co-conspirators. Erber v. United
States, 234 Fed. 221 (1916).
_' After a conspiracy has come to an end, whether by. the accomplishment
of the common design or by abandonment, the-admissions of one conspirator,
by way of nrrative of past facts, are not admissible in evidence against
the others,-People v. Kief, x26 N. Y. 661 (i89i); Novkovic v. State, x35 N.
W. 465 (Wis. 1912) ;. Kahn v. State, io5 N. E. 385 (Ind. I914),"1hether
the declarations tend to implicate the others, Crosby v. People, z37 IlL
325 (1891), or exonerate them.'People v. Hall, 94 Ca. 595 (i8g2). Such
declarations are only competent against the declarant.Y State v. Beaucleigh,
92 Mo. 490 (1887); Hicks v. State, 75 S. E. 12 (Ga. 19m2).
$ An error, on the part of the court, in admitting the declarations of a
co-conspirator, made after the termination of the conspiracy, as evidence.
against anyone but the declarant himself, is not cu~red by a subsequent in-
struction to the jury to disregard the statement.' People v. Oldham, in
CaL 648 (1896).
5 Before a statement of one conspirator may be admitted in evidence
against the others, the court must determine whether sufficient evidence of
a conspiracy has been adduced, or the evidence will be objectionable as
hearsay. Stager v. United States, 233 Fed. sio (x16). Tbe evidence need
only establish prima facie the existence of the conspiracy.t"Baker v. State,
8o Wis- 417 (1891).
EViDzNcE-L.ADING QUESTIONs-DiscRaoN o CouRT-In an action
against a railroad for negligence, the court overruled an objection that a
certain question was leading. Held: Whether or not a question is leailing
is purely a discretionary matter for the court. Mingoes v. Central R. R.
of N. J., 98 At. 459 (N. J. 1916).
It is the general rule that the allowance or exclusion of leading ques-
tions is within the discretion of the court, and in the absence ol a palpable
abuse of discretion, resulting in substantial injury to the accused,. their
allowance is not of itself ground for reversal. People v. Kromphold, 357
Pac. 599 (Cal. 1916); Talley v. State, 159 Pac. 59 (Ariz. i9t6); Common-
wealth v. Turner, 112 N. E. 864 (Mass. 1916). A great latitude is -allowed
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where a witness appears to be hostile, Blair v. State, 72 Neb. 5oi (x9o4);
State v. Dalton, 43 Wash. 278. (izo6), or is young and does not readily
understand English, State v. Drake, z28 Iowa 539 (i905), or is feeble-
minded, State v. Simes, 12 Idaho 310 (t96). A question which is improper
on direct examination may be proper on cross-examination. Hayward v.
Scott, 114 -Ill. App. 53i (igo4). Some courts hold that the right of
reasonable cross-examination by leading questions is absolute; the denial
of it is the denial of a valuable right and, if prejudicial, constitutes re-
versible error. Hempton v. State, iii Wis. x27 (19o); Bell v. State, 48
Tex. Crim. Rep. 256 (19o5). But see contra, Mann v. State, 134 Ala. i
(i9o2), where it is held to lie within the discretion of the court. On re-
direct examination it is within the discretion of the court to say whether
the questions are leading. Mann. v. State, supra. Questions in the alternative
are not necessarily leading, although a question, "Was the headlight a
regulation one or another kind?", was held leading in Chicago City Ry. Co.
v. Shaw, =2o IlL 532 (i9o6). It has been held that the test of a leading
question is whether it suggests the answer desired, but the fact that it may
be answered "yes" or "no," does not make it leading. DeWitt v. Skinner,
232 Fed. 443 (z9x6).
EVIDENCE-JUDGE--COMPETENCY AS WITNESs-A judge cannot be com-
pelled to testify in a case as to matters before him on a previous trial, but
may do so, if he wishes. Hale v. Wyatt, 98 At. 379 (N. H. 1916).
It is a well-settled rule of law that a judge cannot testify in a trial
over which he is presiding unless the evidence is formal or un-
disputed. People v. Miller, 2 Parker 197 (N. Y. 1854). State v. Dyer, 58
At. 947 (Del. 1904). And certainly he cannot testify therein over the
objection of the party against whom he is called as a witness. Rogers v.
State, 6o Ark. 76 (1894); Maitland v. Zanga, 14 Wash. 92 (i896). A
judge is justified by public policy in refusing to testifylas to the happenings
or testimony given, in a former trial before him, but it will furnish no
ground of exception should he not insist upon his right to be excused.
Welcome v. Batchelder, 23 Me. 85 (1843). There are few courts which
maintain a doctrine that it is not competent for a judge to testify if he
wishes, as to facts occurring on a previous trial before him, State v. Hind-
man, 65 N. E. 911 (Ind. i9o3) ; State v. Bringgold, 82Pac. 132 (Wash. 1905) ;
Garnett v. Comm., 83 S. E. 1083 (Va. 1915), or that he may not be called ulTon
to explain the grounds of the decision, so that it will not be necessary
to determine them exclusively from the record. Barlow v. Clark, 67 Mo.
App. 34o (1896); Warfield v. Security Brewing Co., ig Fed. 358
(La. 1912). Some state statutes provide, that a judge may be called
as a witness by either party, or to explain an alleged irregularity in
the former liroceedings, there being vested in him the discretion of either
ordering the trial postponed or suspended and if postponed, directing a
change of venue or a continuance to take place before another judge,
or in his own court. State v. Houghton, 75 Pac. 887 (Ore. x9o4);
Breen v. State. 34 Mont. 107 (19o6). The fact that he is a principal
witness is not a circumstance which could have any weight with the jury,
and therefore it is not necessary that a jury be instructed how to receive
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such testimony. State v. Duffy, 57 Conn. S6 (1889); People v. Hartwell
55 App. Div. N. Y. 234 (i9o).
A very few courts take the position that it is contrary to public policy
and convenience to permit a judge who has tried a case and decided it, to
be called as a witness, even with his consent, either to state the grounds
upon which his decision was based, Noland v. People, 8o Pac. 887 (CoL
i9O5), or to testify concerning statements or transactions taking place
before him. Delaware Lodge v. Allmon, 39 AM xog8 (DeL i897).
JUDGXENTs-REs JUDIcATA-Having lost a suit under statute for mental
anguish through failure to deliver a telegram, plaintiff sues at common law
for wilful failure to deliver. Held: The previous judgment on the same
transaction is a complete bar. Greer v. Western Union Tel. Co., 89 S. E. ;8
(S. C. 1916).
The general rule is that where the subject matter and the cause of
action in both cases are the same, the prior adjudication is a-bar to recovery
in the second. Hatch v. Coddington, 32 Minn. 92 (z884); McCain v. Louis-
ville & N. R. Co., 97 Ky. 8o4 0893); So. Pac. R. R. Co. v: United States,
x68 U. S. x (U. S. Sup. Ct. I897). There are many exceptions to this rule
as in Lovell v. Hammond Co., 66 Conn. 0oo (i895), where it was held that
a judgment in replevin was no bar to an action to recover value of non-
repleviable property taken in one trespass; or as in Matthews v. Hennon, 67
N. W. 226 (Iowa 1896), which held that a replevin judgment was no bar
to a subsequent action for the "use" of similar property taken at the same
time.
A plaintiff has no right to split up a ground of action into several
causes of action. It is his duty to put in issue in the one suit every issuable
matter which naturally arose out of the transaction, Marble v. Keyes, 75
Mass. 221 (1857); Roby v. Eggers, 130 Ind. 415 (i9i). However, it has
been held his duty does not extend to libel suits. Cook v. Conners, xo9 N.
- 78 (N. Y. 1915).
To be a bar the judgment must now be on the merits of the case, Coyie
v. Taunton Trust Co., 1o3 N. E. 289 (Mass. 1913), reviewed in 62 U. or
P. L R. 39o, and must have been judicially passed upon in a court of corn-
petent jurisdiction, Rogers v. Wood, 2 B. & Adol. 45 (Eng. Chan. 1831),"
except in certain cases where a party has voluntarily bound himself to
abide by the decision of some tribunal other than a court. Woolsey v.
Independent Order of Odd Fellows, 61 Iowa 492 (1883), and the cases
collected in Black on Judgments (2d.Ed.) 780.
A former judgment may not have the effect of a bar, but still be con-
clusive as to one or more issues of fact or law between the parties litigant.
Southern Pac. R. R. Co. v. United States, .sura.
Where the previous judgment was that the judgment of the court below
be reversed, and the complaint dismissed, it was held that all questions
which were made or could have been made upon the former trial have
become res judicata. Halsall v. Railway Co. oo S. C. 483 (1914).
For a further discussion of Judgments and the doctrine of Res Judicata
see 62 U. or PA. L. REV. 6;9, and 63 U. OF PA. L REv. i4o.
MASTER AND SERVANTS-INJURY TO THIRD PERSONS-JoINDER OF PARTIES
-An automobile negligently driven by a servant injured a third person.
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Held: Though liable on different grounds, the master and servant may be
joined in a suit to recover for the injury. Royer v. Rasumssen, 158 N. W.
988 (N. D. x9x6).
Although it was well established law, that a master would be liable as
joint tort feasor with his servant for an injury caused by the servant at
his direction, yet the courts in early cases were troubled with the question
when this fact was not apparent. Michael v. Alestree, 2 Levinz 172 (Eng.
i68o). In 1838, Cowen, J, in Wright v. Wilcox, i9 Wend. 343 (N. Y.),
held that the master would not be liable for the servant's wilful injury; but
if it was a case of strict negligence while in the master's service, a joint
action would lie. But in Massachusetts it was held that unless the master
directed or commanded the trespass or injury he would not be liable jointly
with the servant because there would be no right of contribution. Parsons
v. Winchell, 5 Cush. 592 (i85o). To hold otherwise would be allowing a
misjoinder of causes of action because the master's liability is in case while
that of the servant is in trespass. Campbell v. Portland Sugar Co.. 62 Me.
552 (1873) ; Clark v. Fry, 8 Ohio SL 358 (1858); McNemar v. Cohn. n15 I1.
App. 31 (i9o4). The majority of jurisdictions, however, including the
court in the principal case, are in accord with Wright v. Wilcox, supra.
Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Carlock, 72 So. 261 (Ala. 1916). The cases
point out that there is a right of contribution, for the master can recover
from the servant, and the other reasons for refusing to allow joinder are
purely technical. Mayberry v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., xoo Mini. 79
(1907).
The question of joinder arose in the Federal courts in regard to the
right to removal thereto, and the decisions are not in accord. In an elaborate
and well reasoned opinion, Judge Taft held that the master could not be
joined with the servant on the ground of respondeat superior alone. Warax
v. Cincinnati, etc., Ry. Co., 72 Fed. 637 (896). Other courts reached dif-
ferent conclusions. Deere, Wells & Co. v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co, 85 Fed. 876
(1898); Davenport v. Southern, etc., Ry. Co., 135 Fed. 96o (i9o5). But as
far as the right to removal is concerned, the question was settled by the.
Supreme Court holding-that they could be joined. Railway Co. v. Thompson,
200 U. S. 2o6 (,o6).
PRoPERY-ADvERSE Possessox-Coioa OF TsTE-TAx DEam-In a suit
involving a claim of title by adverse possession. Held: Occupancy under a
certificate of purchase at a tax sale is not under color of title. Bruschi v.
Cooper, s5g Pac. 728 (Cal. 1916).
Since color of title is any writing which purports to convey the title
to land by apt words of transfer, it bas been held that a tax deed, being
subject to an equity of redemption, cannot constitute color of title. Pease
v. Lawson, 33 Mo. 35 (1862). There is a split of authority on the
question. Some cases hold that a tax deed constitutes color of title from the
date of expiration of the equity of redemption. Morse v. Seibold, 147 Ill.
318 (1893); Davis v. Howe, 176 S. W. 759 (Tex. 1915). Where by statutory
provision the sale was made on absolute investiture of title, a deed was held
to create color of title. Fletcher v. Worthen, 71 Ark. 386 (897).- Other
cases hold a tax deed, color of title. Reddick v. Long, 124 Ala. -6o (1899) ;
Winters v. Haines, 1o7 Tenn. 337 (igox); Earl v. Harris, 182 S. W. 273
(Ark. 19i6).
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Since the split is on the question as to whether the instrument to con-
stitute color of title must purport to convey title or not, -it would be ex-
pected that -where a tax deed is held sufficient, that the certificate of pur-
chase at a tax sale would likewise constitute color of title. Such a certificate
was held insufficient in McKnight v. Taylor, 37 Mo. 310 (1866), and in De
Graw v. Taylor, 37 Mo. 31o (1866), it was held that a tax deed contributed
color of title from the date of its issuance and not from the date of the
sale.
There is a tendency to hold that any instrument defining the claim will
constitute color of title, whether it purports to convey a fee or not. So a
bond for title, Continental Realty Co. v. Harvey, 52 S. W. 255 (Ky. 1913),
a contract for a right of way, Scott v. Texas & P. R. R., 94 Fed. 34o (Tx.
1899), and a mere knowledge of the land claimed, Thompson v. Williamson,
177 S. W. 987 (Tex. 1915), were held to constitute color of title.
PROPF.RTY-EASEM NTS-StRREN.F.ER By Nov-UsER-A land owner used
a road, which had not been used for thirty-eight years, and relied on.a right
either of a public or private right of way. Held: Unexplained cessation to
use a way, originally acquired by use, for twenty years, is a surrender of the
easement. Wooster v. Fiske, 98 Adt. 378 (Me. 1916).
It is well settled that non-user of a way originally acquired by prescrip-
tion, coupled with an intent to abandon the way, is a surrender of the ease-
ment. Coming v. Goud, 16 Wend. 531 (N. Y. 1837); Dana v. Valentine, 46
Mass. 8 (1842). But mere non-user for twenty years is simply evidence of
an intention to abandon and may be explained. Pratt v. Sweetser, 68 Me.
344 (1878). If there is the intention to surrender the right, then non-
user for however short a time suffices. R. R. v. Covington, 2 Bush. 526
(Ky. 1866) ; Snell v. Levitt. i8 N. E. 370 (N. Y. 1888). But if there is no
intention to abandon the right, then non-user for twenty years will not
work an abandonment. New Eng. Structural Co. v. Distillery Co., 75 N. E.
85 (Mass. 9o5). Some courts hold that there must be both non-user .and
adverse use to work a surrender. Citizens' Electric Co. v. Davis, 44 Pa.
Super. 138 (i9io); City of Baltimore v. Canton Co., 93 Atl. 144 (Md
1915).
The cases distinguished between easements acquired by prescription and
those acquired by grant. Adams v. Hodgkins, 84 Atl. 53o (Me. 1912).
It has been pointed out that there should be no distinction where the ease-
ment acquired by prescription is based on the fiction of a lost grant. Veghtl
v. Raritan Water Co., ig N. J. Eq. z42 (868). The decisions are uniform
that mere non-user does not make a surrender, where there has been a
grant. In re City of Buffalo, i2o N. Y. S. 611 (191p) ; Burnham i. Mahoney,
iii N. E. 396 (Mass. ig96).
The mere fact that another way is used for a time does not indicate a
surrender of the old way; this rule applies whether the easement was
acquired by prescription or by grant. McCue v. Water Co., 3z Pac. 461
(Wash. 89) ; Bowen v. Cooper; 156 S. W. 601 (Ky. 1902). Whether there is
a surrender of an easement is a question to be determined from the circum-
stances of each case, and neither non-user nor length of time is absolutely
determinative. Mason v. Ross, 71 AtI. 141 (N. J. Ch. 19o).
308 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAIV REVIEW
PR PERTY-NAViGABLE WATERS-RIGHTS oF LITTORAL OwNERs-The title
to the subaqueous land of a lake is in the state as trustee for the benefit
of the people; yet a littoral owner, under certain conditions, is entitled to
access to navigable water. State v. Cleveland, Penna. Ry. Co., 113 N. E. 677
(Ohio 1916).
The state holds title to the beds of navigable lakes below the natural
high water mark for the use and benefit of the people, subject to the rights
vested by the Constitution, "Atlee v. Packet Co., 21 Wall. 389 (U. S. 1874);
Ex Parle Powell, 70 So. 392 (Fla. 1915); Bond v. Reynolds, 159 N. Y. S.
317 (ig6), and cannot delegate its trusteeship. Jackson Co. Y. Quarles,
x82 S. W. 283 (Ark. i916). But the sovereign authority may authorize
t'he construction of a pier or wharf, even though it will be an obstruction in
navigable waters. Austin v. Rutland Ry. Co., 45 Vt. 215 (i873); Howell v.
Jessup, i6o N. Y. 249 (igoo); Panama Co. v. Ry. Co, 71 So. 6o8 (Fla. i9i6).
The rule that the title to submerged lands in front of adjoining uplands is
not burdened with an easement in favor of the owner of the upland, for
the purpose of building wharves or other structures upon the submerged
land to reach navigable waters, is unquestioned. Cobb v. Comms. of Lin-
coln Park, 2o2 II. 427 (x9o3); People v. The D. and H. Co., 213 N. Y.
194 (1915). Indeed every and all rights of such owners are subject to public
easements for the purposes of nagivation, and must yield thereto when
asserted by the state or its agencies. Barnes v. Terminal Co., 193 N. Y. 378
(i9o8); Borrell '. Mfg. Co., In N. E. 932 (Ind. 1916). And inasmuch
as ownership of the shore extends only to the water's edge, erection of
piers. which interfere with the public's use of navigable bodies of water,
constitutes a purpresture. Commissioners of Park v. Fahrney, 25o Il. 256
(1911); People v. Steeplechase Park, 165 App. Div. N. Y. 231 (x915).
Yet acts of such a character are not to be prohibited absolutely, because
by such an interpretation, the execution of the trusteeship of the waterways
would defeat the very purpose for which it was established. Providence
Co. v. Stonington Co., 12 R. I. 348 (1879); McBurney v. Young, 67 Vt. 574
(1895). And it has naturally followed that a littoral owner may.build wharves
from the upland to navigable water for the p-irpose of rendering his means
of access more available, practical, and serviceable when superior public
rights are not obstructed thereby. Brookhaven v. Smith, 188 N. Y. 74 (1907);
Bissell v. Mfg. Co., supra (Ind. i916).
PROPERTY-TTITLE BY PRESCRIPTIox-EFFECT OF A PAROL GFr--A Creamery
Company gave to a Railroad a right of .way over its land which the Rail-
road used for general switching purposes for twenty-four years. The
Creamery Company having gone out of business, their grantee brings an
action to establish his title. Held: The railroad acquired no easement either
by parol dedication or by prescription. Shamanek v. Chicago, M. & St. P.
Ry. Co., 159 N W. 237 (Iowa 19i6).
The weight of authority is. clearly to the effect that an easement can
not be acquired by a railroad through a parol dedication. Lake Erie &Western Ry. v. Whitman, 155 I111 5 4 (x895); Mahar v. Grand Rapids Ter-
minal Ry. Co., 174 Mich. 138 (i913). The reason was well stated in Watson
v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co.. 46 Minn. 321 (1891), where the court said
"Where land is to be employed in the public use,by a business corpora-
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flon, there is no reason founded on necessity, for the doctrine of dedication;
because there is in such case a grantee in esse capable of taking a grant.
The ownership of property is private, though the use required to be made
of it is public. The private ownership prevents the 'acquisition of it by
dedication." 
There are, however, several cases which hold a contrary view basing
such views on the ground that the public character of such a corporation
enables it to acquire land in that way. It is a dedication by estoppel is.pais.
Morgan v. Railroad Co., 96 U. S. 716 (1877); Texas & New Orleans Ry.
Co. v. Sutor, 56 Tex. 496 (1882); Rutger v. Medina Valley Co., 153 N. W.
38o (Tex. 1913). A dedication can be made under statute in many juris-
dictions by the filing of a town plat with a right of way to a railroad
laid out thereon. Morgan v. Railroad Co., supra; Nobelsvill v. The Lake
Erie & Western Railroad Co., 13o Ind. i (189!). Since the plat acts as a
deed of conveyance the dedication thereunder must be evidenced wholly by
the plat. It can not rest partially on parol evidence. Watson v. Railroad,
supra.
That no title was gained by perscription in the principal case is entirely
in line ,'Vith authorities on the subject. An uninterrupted user for the
statutory period does not vest an easement when as in the principle case
the user was permissive for the first twelve years. Ball v. Kehl, 96 Cal. 6o6
(1892); First Nation Bank v. Savings Bank, 71 N. H. 547 (1902).
It is no objection, however to obtaining an easement by perscription that
the same was originally granted by parol, Lechman v. Mills, 46 Wash. 624
(1907), provided the grant was meant to be an absolute one. This was not
found to be so in the principal case.
TORT-INDEPENDENT NEGLIGENCE OF PASSENGER-KNOWLEDGE OF DRIVER'S
I.Toxic.%ATox-A guest was killed by the reckless driving of the owner of
the automobile. Both were intoxicated. Held: Plaintiff .testator's right of
recovery was barred. Powell v. Berry, 89 S. E. 753 (Ga. 1916).
One voluntarily accepting a ride as a guest in an automobile, does not
relinquish his right of personal protection; the owner .is under a duty
to use ordinary care in the operation of the machine. Lockhead v. Jensen,
129g Pac. 347 (Utah 1912); Fitzjarrel v. Boyd, 123 Md. 497 (1914). And
the fact that both the owner and the guest are engaged in a common enter-
prise, or joint venture, does not change the liability the confidence accepted,
being an adequate consideration to support the duty. Withey v. Fowler Co.,
145 N. W. 923 (Ia. 1913); Beard v. Klusmeier, 164 S. V. 319 (Kan. i914).
Yet the duty of a guest in a vehicle over a driver of whom he has no
control, is to use reasonable care for his own safety, the degree of which
care is primarily a question for the jury. Schultz v. Old Colony Ry., 193
Mass. 309 (19o7); Mittelsdorfer v. West Jersey Co., 73 Atl. 540 (N. J.
199); Christopherson v. Minneapolis Co., 147 N. W. 791 (Minn. 1914).
Indeed a recovery on his part is defeated when such negligence "amounts
to a failure to exercise ordinary care. Rollestone v. Cassirer Co., 59 S. E.-
442 (Ga. 1907). So riding in an automobile with a driver he must 
have
known to have been so intoxicated, as to be incapable of giving 
the atten-
tion to what he was doing, that a man of prudence and reasonable ifitelligence
would have given, establishes independant negligence upon the guest's part,
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so as- to deny his right to recover, independant of the driver's negligence.
Lynn v. Goodwin, 17o Cal. 112 (igis). The fact that the passenger is also
intoxicated, does not change his duty to use ordinary care for his safety.
Cunningham v. Erie R. Co., 137 App. Div. N. Y. 5o6 (1910). It has been
pointed out that the true reason of the rule which denies relief to an
injured party, who has contributed to the injury by his own fault, is simply
the impossibility in most cases of equitably apportioning the damages between
the parties. in a common law action. Heil v. Glanding, 42 Pa. 493 (1862);
Shimoda v. Bundy, 24 Cal. App. 675 (1914).
ToRTS-TRESPASS-EXTENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF- PENNA. COAL CO. V.
SAINDERSO,-In conducting his business a quarry owner blasted on his
premises, casting rocks onto adjoining land. Held: This was a direct tres-
pass and liability does not depen, on negligence; the doctrine of Penna.
Coal Co. v. Sanderson does not apply. Mulchanock v. Whitehall Cement
Mfg. Co.. 98 Atl. sm (Pa. igi6).
To cast rocks and debris on another's land by blasting is a trespass
according to the general rule, and it is no defense that the operation
was conducted with care. Tiffen v. McCormick, .32 Am. Rep. 4o8 (Ohio-
1878); Colton v. Onderdonk, io Pac. 395 (Cal. IS86). There is a dif-
ference of opinion as to whether a municipality is liable in trespass, when
the blasting is done by a contractor engaged in constructing public works.
Murphy v. Lowell, 128 Mass. 398 (x88o); St. Peter v. Denison, 17 Am. Rep.
258 (N. Y. 874); City of Joliet v. Harwood, 86 IllII. io (x877).
In the principal case, Penna. Coal Co. v Sanderson, 6 Ati. 453 (Pa.
1886), was relied on. This case has been commented upon, and its doctrine
has been repudiated in the following jurisdictions: Young & Co. v. Bankier
Distillery Co., App. Cas. 1893, 69i (Eng.); Beach v. Sterling Iron & Zinc
Co., 33 Atl. 286 (N. J. Eq. j895); Strobel v. Kerr Salt Co., 164 N. Y. 303
(igoo); Straight v. Hover, 87 N. E. 174 (Ohio igog); Coal Co. v. Ruffner,
io Ann. Cos. .81 (Tenn. '9o7); Arminius Chemical Co. v. Landrum, 73
S. E. 459 (Va. 1912). Nor was the doctrine followed in these cases: Coal
Co. v. Pierce, 68 S. 563 (Ala. 1915); Packwood v. Coal Co., $6 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 91! (Wash. 19t5) ; Day v. Coal Co., 6o IV. Va. 27 (t9o6). Indiana
seems to be the only jurisdiction influenced by the doctrine. Barnard v.
Shirley, 47 N. E. 671 (Ind. 1897); Ohio Oil Co. v. UVestfall, 88 N. E. 354
(Ind. 1909).
In Pennsylvania the doctrine of Coal Co. v. Sanderson has never been
exiended beyond the limitation put upon it by its own facts. The early
decisions influenced by the doctrine may be found in the article, "Natural
Use of Land," by John Marshall Gest, 33 Am. Law Reg. r, 97. The case
has often been referred to, but always strictly limited. Thus, the doctrine
was held not to apply to subterranean waters, Collins v. Chartiers' Valley Gas
Co, 131 Pa. 143 (iS9o); nor tor the operation of coke ovens, Robb v.
Carnegie, 145 Pa. 324 (1891); nor to leakage from oil pipes, Hauck v. Pipe
Line Co., 53 Pa. 366 (1893); nor to culm deposited on the bank of a
stream, Hindson v. Markle, 33 AtL. 74 (Pa. i895); nor to the removal of
surface support, Robertson v. Coal Co., 33 AtL 706 (Pa. 1896); nor to
pollution of water for public use, Commonwealth v. Russel, 33 AtL. 7o9 (Pa.
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1896); nor to the operation of steel mills, Sullivan v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Co., 57 Atl. io65 (Pa. xgo4); nor to mines when the water is discharged
into a drainage basin other than the natural basin, McCune v. Coal
'
Co., 85 At. iio2 (Pa. x193).
ToRTs-VIoLATION oF PENAL STATUTE AS NEGLuXNcEPer Se-Violation
of a mandatory Factory Act, which provides a penalty for failure to guard
dangerous machinery, though it does not expressly provide for the recovery
of damages, is negligence per se, and deprives the employer of the defense
of voluntary assumption of risk, though he may interpose the defense of
contributory negligence. Sulzberger & Sons Co. v. Strickland, i59 Pac. 833
(Okla. ixg6).
Where the statute provides that damages may be recovered, obviously it
matters little whether the violations are termed negligence per se or not. But
the difference of opinion comes in the case where there is a penal provision
only. The weight of authority holds, with the principal-case, that a viola-
tion of such statute is negligence per se, or a breach of duty toward those
intended to be protected thereby. Bott v. Pratt, 33 Mitin. 323 (s885); Hall
v. West & Slade Mill Co., 39 Wash. 447 (i9o$); Steel Car Forge Co. Y.
Chec, 184 Fed. 868 (19i) (case of employment of children under lawful
age). Other courts hold that such violations are either prima fade or
competent evidence of negligence to be rebutted by the defendant. Kircher
v. Iron Clad Mfg. Co, 134 App. Div. of N. Y. Supr. x44 (igo9). Pennsyl-
vania courts hold that violation of such a statute is not negligence as a
matter of law, but only "some evidence of negligence" to be considered
with the rest of the evidence. Drake v. Fenton, 237 Pa. 8, 1 (igia).
Even though the employee knows of the violation of the statute, be
does not assume the risk of the danger, and the employer is deprived of
that defense, as in the principal case. Hall v. West & Slade Mill Co.,
supra; Valjago v. Carnegie Steel Co., 226 Pa. 514 (910); Luken v. Lake
Shore and Mich. Southern Rwy. Co.. 248 Ill. 377 (i9gx). There have been
many decisions to the contrary, especially in our Federal courts. Denver
& Rio Grande R. R. Co. v. Norgate, 141 Fed. Rep. 247 (19Go). Under the
former rule, where the statute forbids employment of children under a
certain age, it has been pointed out that negligence of a fellow servant is
no defense, for the contract between the employer and child is void. Dalm
v. Bryant Paper Co., 157 Mich. 550 (199o).
The general rule that the employer may interpose the defense of the
employee's contributory negligence in these cases is in accord with the
principal case. Berdos v. Suffolk Mills.'2og Mass. 489 (19T1). Even this is
denied by some courts. Fortier v. The Fair, 153 Ill. App. 2oo (igxo);
Glucina v. Goss Brick Co., 63 Wash. 401 (i9iT). A child has been allowed
to recover, where he was employed in violation of a statute, even though
the act was not within the scope of his employment, on the theory that
he lacks discretion to protect himself. Stehle v. Jaeger Automatic Mach.
Co., 220 Pa. 617 (igo8); Frank Co. v. Standard Ins. Co., 176 Fed. 16
(1910).
A father cannot recover for injury to a child employed in violation'
of a statute which expressly gives the employee the right to recover dam-
ages, Gibson v. Packing Box Co., 85 Kan. 346 (1911), for violation of the
statute is actionable only as to those intended to be benefited or protected,
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even though the recovery of damages is not expressly provided for and
the statute is penal. Casteel v. Paving & Brick Co., 83 Kan. 533 (1910).
For a discussion of like questions where ordinances are involved, see
a note in x Va. Law Rev.-558-56t.
TRusTs-CoxsTRUCT0o.-PoWi:R oF TRUSTEE-Trustees, though pro-
hibited by the will from making any original ,investments in the capital stock
of a corporation, held five hundred shares of bank stock by virtue of the
right also given them to continue any investment made by the testator.
The bank increased its. capital stock giving to each stockholder the right to
subscribe for additional shares which subscription the trustees made. Held:
The investment merely preserved their original holding and was proper
despite the inhibition. In re Tower's Estate 98 At. 576 (Pa. 1916).
With the power expressly given them -to continue the testator's ifivest-
ments. the trustees would clearly have been within their rights, had not
the inhibition been present and even though the stock was not of the class
of approved investments. The Merchants Loan and Trust Trust Co. v.
Marshall Field, et. al., 250 Ill. 86 (1911); Ballantine v. Young, 81 AtI. 119
(N. J. 1911). Without, however, a definite authorization to continue any
investment practically the same liability attaches as in the case of an original
one and the trustee should sell and convert into an approved security
anything not a regular investment. Ward v. Ketchin, 30 N. J. Eq. 31
(87;8); Matter of Win. C. Wotton Ex., 59 N. Y. App. Div. 584 (igoi);
Cannon v. Quincy, 121 N. Y. S. 752 (1909). Where the author of a trust
gives explicit directions as to the classes of investments to be made such
directions must be followed literally. Worcester City Missionary Society
V. Memorial Church, i86 Mass. 531 (i9o4); Gilbert v. Welch, 75 Ind. 557
(1881). When, as in the principal case, the peculiar conditions seem to
warrant a departure from the strict provisions the trustees should seek
the instructions of the court, White v. Sherman, 168 I11. 589 (1897); Derrs
Estate, -o3 Pa. St. 96 (igo2), and if this is not done the burden is on
them to show that the investment was prudent. Cridland's Est., 132 Pa.
479 (1&9o).
Cases like the principal one have usually arisen when the trustees have
made such a purchase of the stock increase with an extraordinary dividend
declared at the time. The question then arises as to whether the one who
has merely the income for life or the remainderman is entitled to this
additional stock. The ordinary cash dividends of course belong to life
tenant. Ballintine v. Young. supra. In an elaborate opinion by Justice
Gray, the Supreme Court of the United States, held that stock dividends
should always be considered part of the principal. Gibbons v. Mahon, 136
U. S. 49 (i89o). 'This is the English rule and is followed by Mass.,
Illinois and the New England States. Bouche v. Sproule, 12 App. Cos. 385
(Eng. 1887): Talbott v. Hlutchins, 221 Mass. 367 (1915). Pennsylvania very
early adopted a different rule by which stock dividends are apportioned
according to the time. when the surplus profits which they represent 
were
earned. Farp's Appeal, 28 Pa. St. 368 (1858); Stokes Estate No. r, 24o Pa.
St. 77 (1013). New Jersey. New Htampshire and New York as well 
as
some Vestern States follow this rule.
